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Retributivism and Totality Ȃ Can Bulk Discounts for Multiple Offending Fit 
the Crime? 
 
Christopher Bennett 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Sheffield 
c.bennett@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
 
 
The charging and sentencing of multiple offenders is an important point at which 
discretion enters the criminal justice system. Discretion need not be a bad thing 
in a legal system; but there should be principles by which its exercise is guided, 
and to which it is accountable, and these principles should have a transparent 
public justification. At present the principle that seems to operate widely with 
respect to multiple offenders is what has Ǯǯ 
(Jareborg 1998). In this paper, I identify two ways in which multiple offenders 
seem to pose a problem for broadly retributive principles of sentencing. I will 
argue that these problems are only apparent; looking at the proper place and 
exercise of discretion will help us to see why.  
 
In Section 1, I introduce the issue of multiple offending, pointing to the discretion 
it apparently gives sentencers, anǮǯ that appears to 
guide decisions. In Section 2, I point out two ways in which bulk discounts may 
appear to conflict with retributive sentencing theory, which I call the Fittingness 
Problem and the Selection Problem. In Section 3, I introduce what I take to be the 
key guiding thought within retributive approaches to criminal justice, and I 
distinguish between two types of retributivism, Moralistic and Legalistic. In 
Section 4 I argue that Moralistic Retributivism should, if certain conditions are 
met, be happy to allow discretion at sentencing in order to allow the criminal 
justice system better to comply with the relevant moral ends. This addresses the 
Selection Problem, and leaves the question whether retributive sentencing goals 
are compatible with bulk discounts. In Section 5 I argue that the view that they 
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are incompatible rests on ȋǮ-invariantism about ǯȌ; however, I argue against this assumption. This addresses the 
Fittingness Problem, and concludes my case for arguing that retributivism is 
compatible with common sentencing practice regarding multiple offenders. 
Section 6 draws the argument together. 
 
Before I begin, let me say something briefly about the philosophical methodology 
adopted in this paper. Ǯǯ
the practice of sentencing multiple offenders. I will take it that the persistence of Ǯǯsentencing practice shows that 
practitioners find it intuitively compellingǤȋǮǯ
principle operates when we think about blame and blameworthiness in 
interpersonal relations: for some argument on this point, see Bennett 2010; 
though this claim is disputed by Hoskins this volume.) Men and women making 
difficult and weighty sentencing decisions, and whom we have no special reason 
to judge lacking in competence or commitment, are unwilling to sacrifice the 
bulk discount principle. Furthermore, this unwillingness persists in the face of 
the lack of an articulated and satisfactory justification for the principle; even in 
the face of apparently good reasons to abandon the principle, as we will see 
below. This shows a high degree of commitment to the principle, or abhorrence 
of its alternatives. The persistence of the bulk discount principle does not in itself 
show it to be well-grounded, of course. Other possible explanations for its 
persistence might be better: that practitioners are in the grip of a false ideology; 
or that they are not good at reckoning with cases involving many victims (Ryberg 
this volume); or that bureaucratic inertia prevents sensible changes. The 
question, in the end, is what is the best explanation of the fact that sentencers act 
as they do: whether it is ǯ 
favouring bulk discounts; or rather a disabling factor that interferes with their 
taking a clear view of the normative situation. My view is that taking seriously 
the practical wisdom of practitioners requires us to reach for Ǯǯ 
explanations only as a last resort. I take it that sentencing is not a matter of 
simple rule-following, but is in some ways a craft in which practitioners bring 
moral intelligence, imagination and insight to bear on individual cases. Our initial 
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job as theorists, then, is to attempt to articulate those considerations that 
practitioners, when asked to commit themselves at the moment of decision, take 
to be compelling Ȃ considerations about which they themselves may be 
inarticulate. Of course, it is a further question whether those articulations 
constitute satisfying justifications. But respect for practitioners as skilled and 
thoughtful decision-makers should make us reluctant to disregard strongly-held 
elements of practice, or to do so only once the search for sympathetic 
justifications of that practice has been exhausted. 
 
1. Multiple offenders and discretion 
We can distinguish two types of multiple offender. First of all, there are those 
who commit a number of distinct Ȃ or at any rate distinguishable Ȃ offences in a 
single episode of criminal activity. Secondly, there is the multiple offender who 
commits a number of offences across a string of episodes of criminal activity.  
If we can usefully divide multiple offenders into these two broad categories, we 
can also identify two points in the criminal justice process at which the 
multiplicity of their offences becomes an issue. First of all, there is the question 
of how many offences police and prosecutors should decide to charge the 
offender with Ȃ and on what basis, if the answer is not all, they should select 
offences. Andrew Ashworth sets out four options that are open to prosecutors 
when dealing with multiple offenders: charging all offences; charging specimen ǢǢǮǯ 
(Ashworth, 2010: 261-3). It seems from this as though the prosecution does have ǮǯǮǡǯ
not required to. But in practice this seems unlikely to happen in many cases. 
Prosecutors have legal discretion, and they exercise it by taking one of the other 
options. Secondly, there is the question of how the multiplicity of offences should 
be dealt with at sentencing.  
 
AǮǯ
criminalisable offence, to give a sentence for that offence which is within the 
normal range for the offence, and to set the sentences consecutively, so that the 
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offender would only start serving one sentence upon the completion of the last. 
Again, however, we can say that it seems unlikely that the offender will be 
sentenced according to this straightforward route. Certainly sentencers do not 
seem to be obliged to take this route. The law appears to be that sentencers are 
restricted to sentencing only for those offences that have been charged, even 
where the offender has admitted to committing other, possibly serious, offences 
(following Lord Bingham in Canavan and Kidd (1998)).1 However, even if ǯ
than are on the charge sheet, it seems as though they can decide not to pass 
sentence for each offence that is on the charge sheet. Furthermore, for all the 
sentences that are passed, they have the option to set the same activity as the 
sentence for a number of offences Ȃ for instance, serving a term in prison Ȃ and 
allowing the sentences to run concurrently, thus allowing the offender to 
discharge a number of sentences without doing anything more than he would 
have had he been serving one sentence. Finally, if the decision is made to set the 
sentences to be served consecutively, sentencers will tend to abide by what 
Thomas has Ǯǯ (Thomas, 1979: 56-7). This principle 
says that the sentence should reflect the totality of the criminal activity, and 
should not allow the sentence for a string of minor offences to mount up to 
something that is more like the sentence for a really serious crime. All of which 
means that sentencers are highly unlikely to take the straightforward route, and 
that the amount of time served by an offender who is sentenced for multiple 
offences after a string of episodes of criminal activity is much less than that 
which would be served by someone who was apprehended after each bout of 
such activity and sentenced separately on each occasion (Reitz, 2010).  
 
2. Multiple offenders and retributive sentencing theory Ǯǯ
arbitrary, at least from the point of view of retributive sentencing theory. The 
first is that it seems to go against the principle that the punishment should fit the 
crime, since it is not the case, under the bulk discount, that each offence is 
punished separately and given the sentence that, considered in isolation as that 
particular offence, would be appropriate to it. Not all offences are put on the 
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charge sheet; some offences are not sentenced for even if they are on the charge ǢǮǯǤ
principles might seem to favour the straightforward approach; it seems that 
insofar as the straightforward approach is universally abandoned in sentencing 
practice, sentencers must be responding to principles other than retributive 
principles. This is therefore grist to the mill of anti-retributivists, who claim that 
retributivism put into practice leads to unacceptable results; and that its 
principles cannot explain the decisions of experienced sentencers (Reitz 2010). I 
will call this the Fittingness Problem: common practice in the punishment of 
multiple offenders seems to abandon the principle that punishment should fit 
the crime.  
 
The second problem arises even if we accept that there might be a justification in 
retributive sentencing principles for giving a bulk discount for multiple offences; 
it concerns rather the principle by which it is decided which offences should be 
put on the charge sheet in the first place. The case of multiple offending 
demonstrates that it is often the case that not all offences are put on the charge 
sheet Ȃ rather some selection is made. Retributivism, it might be thought, claims 
that criminal justice systems should respond to the need to do justice to 
instances of wrongdoing by treating them as wrongdoing, to vindicate victims, 
and to pass punishments appropriate for such wrongdoing. This would appear to 
favour taking each instance of criminal action seriously and reflecting the moral 
nature of that criminality in sentencing. It is unlike a deterrent theory where 
playing fast and loose with individual offences might be quite appropriate as 
long as it gets results: it seems that retributivism on principle favours a kind of 
rigorism, since its justification for punishment looks to do justice to past offences 
rather than bring about some future good. So retributivism again seems to stand 
against the common sentencing practice of selecting amongst offences at 
charging and sentencing. I will call this the Selection Problem: common practice 
in the sentencing of multiple offenders appears to abandon the retributive 
principle of taking each instance of wrongdoing seriously. 
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My approach in this paper is to suggest that the conception of retributive 
principles outlined here, and which is claimed to be incompatible with common 
sentencing practice for multiple offenders, is overly simple, and that a more 
sophisticated version of retributivism can avoid these concerns. In this next 
section I will start by outlining some assumptions about retributive sentencing Ǯǯǣly 
on a conception I will call Legalistic Retributivism. This will include a certain ǮǯǤǡ
understanding of retributivism is not the most common, or likely to be the most 
adequate; in its place I will suggest some form of what I will call Moralistic 
Retributivism.  
 
3. Retributivism: Legalistic and Moralistic 
First of all, let me say something about what I take retributive sentencing theory 
to be. I intend this to be a broad category encompassing all those views that take 
a non-instrumental view of the purposes of sentencing, and therefore take some 
kind of response to wrongful or criminal activity as deserved or inherently 
fitting. One thing to make clear at the outset, therefore, is that retributivism is 
not simply to be understood as the view that wrongdoers, or criminal offenders, 
deserve to suffer in proportion to the seriousness of their transgression. The 
fundamental point that distinguishes retributivism from instrumental 
justifications of punishment such as deterrence or preventive detention is rather 
this: that retributivists hold that some response of a specific character is called 
for intrinsically because of the wrongful character of the criminal action (Bennett 
2015). Retributivists hold, in other words, that some specific response is morally 
necessary, independently of the contingent fact that making such a response is 
likely to lead to some independently desirable end, but rather because the ǯmerits such a response (or he deserves that response). 
 
Why is such a response necessary? I think that what is characteristic of 
retributivism is that it involves the claim that something must be done in the 
wake of wrongdoing to dissociate oneself from the wrongdoing Ȃ and that in the 
absence of such dissociating response, one will be in the position of acquiescing 
 7 
in, becoming complicit in, or condoning the wrong. This is the essential claim 
behind retributivism, which explains the position that some response is morally 
necessary independently of other extraneous effects (beneficial or detrimental) 
that that response may have. Retributivists think that the transgression alters 
the way it is morally acceptable to treat or relate to the wrongdoer; if our 
behaviour towards the transgressor does not change to reflect the transgression 
then it will be as though nothing morally impermissible had happened, as if no 
basic limit was violated. This is the claim that those who take a purely 
instrumental view of responses to crime have to reject.  
 
However, if one accepts retributivism thus far, it is a further question what that 
specific response needs to be Ȃ and those I am calling retributivists disagree 
widely on this question. Retributivists believe that Ǯspecificǯ 
response to the transgression needs to be the right one, because only if it is the 
right type of action can it successfully dissociate those who make it from the 
transgression; therefore retributivists need to claim that the nature of the 
appropriate response is non-arbitrary. But there is substantive moral 
disagreement over what the form of the response needs to be in order to bring 
this about. The caricature of retributivism is that what is required is to make the 
wrongdoer suffer. My own view is rather that what is necessary is a partial and 
temporary withdrawal of recognition such as we find in the canonical expression 
of interpersonal blame (Bennett, 2013). The essential thing is that the response 
should mark and do justice to the wrongdoing as a wrongdoing.  
 
We can make a further distinction among varieties of retributivism between 
Legalistic Retributivism and Moralistic Retributivism. Is punishment a response 
to law-breaking, and specifically the wrong of law-breaking, in which case it 
should be proportionate to the legal categorization of the crime, and the desert 
that arises from breaking that law? That would be the position I have called 
Legalistic Retributivism. One version of this view might derive the importance of 
retributivism from the specifically political need to vindicate the authority of the 
law itself. If punishment is not a consequence of law-breaking, this Legal 
Retributivism might hold, the law is not really valid. Given that the law needs to 
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claim authority, and its authority hence needs to be vindicated in the face of 
defiance, this explains why punishment is morally important independently of its 
results.  
 
By contrast, according to Moralistic Retributivism, legal punishment should be 
seen as at best an attempt to approximate a pre-legal moral desert arising from 
wrongdoing. My intention here is not to debate the merits of these two 
approaches to retributivism, but simply to note that influential retributivists like 
Moore and Duff (as well as the present author) defend the Moralistic version 
(Moore, 1992; Duff, 2001; Bennett, 2008). It is enough to note this because it will Ǯǯ
holds that a) the point of the criminal justice system is to treat people as they 
deserve to be treated, whether that is in terms of some quantum of suffering, or 
in terms of deserved condemnation, and b) the legal framework for classifying 
criminal offences and providing procedures for settling on a sentence should be 
seen as at best approximations of that pre-legal desert. 
 
If we adopt Moralistic Retributivism, this does not yet show that we should allow 
sentencers a breadth of discretion to decide on cases of multiple offending which 
might lead to results that appear paradoxical in the context of the existing legal 
framework for classifying crimes (as the treatment of multiple offending might 
appear). There might be further reasons to restrict such discretion Ȃ we will see 
below that there are. But it opens up space at least for a position that holds that, 
when it comes to sentencing, sentencers should aim to decide on the merits of 
the case, and in particular to ask what the appropriate pre-legal desert of the 
offender is, and that they should not be decisively constrained by the prior legal 
classification of the criminal activity. Moralistic Retributivism holds that, at least 
in principle, discretion at sentencing is necessary to allow for the aims of the 
criminal justice system (in adjusting the way the state punishes to pre-legal 
desert) are realized. 
 
The desirability or not of Moralistic Retributivism raises some questions about 
the proper role of discretion. The question I would like to turn to at this point is 
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therefore what attitude we should adopt to the fact that legal officials have the 
discretion that they do when charging and sentencing multiple offenders. 
 
4. Attitudes to discretion 
We should note before we proceed that the existence of discretion in a legal 
system does not mean that an agent is legally free to decide in any way they want 
with impunity. Often a legal role is structured on the assumption (sometimes 
tacit) that, althougǯǡ
responsibility to make a decision through conscientiously paying attention to a 
range of relevant considerations, and only those. So for instance Ȃ to give a non-
legal example Ȃ I may have discretion ǯ
them the mark I see fit to give. Yet my possession of this discretion does not 
mean that it would be permissible for me to assign the marks randomly. 
Although I have discretion, I have a binding professional responsibility to 
exercise my discretion by paying attention to the quality of the essays. In part, 
this limited discretion is reflected in rights of appeal. Yet it seems clear that the 
enforcement of the proper exercise of discretion can only be partial. Appeals are 
time-consuming and costly; they are often resolved by appeal to the discretion of 
another marker; and the justifications that have to be given for decisions are 
rarely such as to explain decisively why that particular mark was appropriate. By 
and large, the university and its students rely on the assumption that its teaching 
staff are dedicated and of good will, and can therefore be trusted to exercise their 
discretion wisely. So exercising discretion wisely can be part of the responsibility ǯfessional role, even if that responsibility is only partially enforceable.  
 
The existence of discretion raises two sorts of questions. First of all, a substantive 
question: how should that discretion ideally be exercised? This is to ask the 
question: given that it falls to this agent to make a decision, what is the right 
decision for her to make? But another question is procedural: by what right does 
this agent get to have the discretion to make this decision as she sees fit? This is 
to ask the question: what procedures should we have for making decisions about 
multiple offenders? The procedural question asks how we should decide on the 
process by which the decision will be made (or at least guided): how to decide to 
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decide (Sunstein and Ullman-Margalit 1999). We look in more detail at the 
dimensions on which discretion may be assessed below.  
 
We can categorise attitudes to discretion in something like the following way. 
First of all, one might argue that discretion is morally necessary because it allows 
leeway within an otherwise rigid system of rules for equity and doing justice to 
the demands of the individual case (Meyer, 2014). In other words, discretion is 
necessary, this approach says, to avoid absurdities that mechanically applying 
the rules would inevitably lead us into. But the reason behind the need for 
discretion then gives us an explanation of how discretion should be used: to 
allow officials scope within the legal framework to make a decision on the moral 
merits of the case rather than being constrained by what prior legislative or 
adjudicatory decisions have provided for. What the moral merits of the case 
consist in might be given two different interpretations: on the one hand, it might 
be taken to encompass all morally relevant considerations (such as, in the case of 
sentencing, the welfare of the offender, the welfare of his dependents, the likely 
effect on the economy of the local area, etc); or on the other one might 
understand the merits of the case to consist in the right way for the institution of 
which one is part to deal with this case, given what one takes to be the best 
interpretation of the defining values of that institution (in our case, the basic 
purposes of sentencing, which, according to a Moralistic Retributivist, would 
confine the range of reasons to be taken into account to those of pre-legal 
desert). Given the impossibility of having the right rule for any eventuality, 
discretion allows for the exercise of a kind of practical moral reasonableness on 
the part of officials. For the sake of having a label, and in order to connect it to 
our previous discussion of Legalistic and Moralistic Retributivism, we can call 
this attitude Morality: the idea that legal structures have to leave room for the 
exercise of conscience by officials in order to avoid rigorism leading to morally 
wrong decisions. 
 
Secondly, however, one might take against giving such discretion to officials on 
the grounds that it opens the way to abuse and inconsistency. Therefore one 
might have the attitude that, on the basis of rule of law values such as certainty, 
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predictability, stability, the limiting of the unaccountable power of public 
officials, and fairness and consistency across cases, exercises of discretion should 
be limited as far as possible, and a rule-governed framework introduced to 
ensure that the decisions are made in a consistent and publicly accountable way. 
The implication of this view is that officials should be constrained in their 
decision-making by a tightly focused body of rules, and will therefore be 
constrained to decide cases in ways that do not always reflect their best 
understanding of the moral merits of the case. This is the view that we will call 
Legality: the idea that discretion should be minimised as far as possible for the 
sake of accountability, consistency and predictability and replaced with binding 
rules.  
 
These two options cover the distinction drawn between Moralistic and Legalistic 
Retributivism. But there is another broad type of attitude to discretion that is 
worth noting. So thirdly, one might be troubled by the power such points of 
discretion invest in particular individuals Ȃ even if these individuals are public 
servants who have a professional ethos and a professional responsibility to 
decide the cases in circumscribed ways. After all, even if officials strive to make 
the decision they think a person in their role ought to be making rather than the 
decision that they think any person of conscience should make, it will 
nevertheless be their outlook and attitudes that shape the nature of the decision. 
Rather, one might feel that such decisions will lack democratic legitimacy since 
they will simply reflect the view taken by the particular individual in charge 
rather than the will of the people taken as a whole. Democracy is a system, one 
might argue, that provides a fair way of coming to what can properly be called 
collective decisions on matters of basic rights, where the reason that it is 
maximally fair is that it gives no person any more influence than any other. 
Discretion invested in one individual goes against this democratic promise by 
making it the case that public servants end up doing more than merely serving 
the people (Waldron, 1999). I will call this view Democracy, the view that 
decisions about the actions of public agencies which are properly taken in the 
name of the people should be made as far as possible in such a way that no any 
one individual has greater sway over the decision than any other.  
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This concern about democratic legitimacy might be assuaged in either of two 
ways, one of which aims to minimize discretion while the other seeks to preserve 
it (hence my claim at the start of the preceding paragraph that there were two 
further types of attitude to discretion worth considering). The first way seeks to 
minimize discretion by identifying the will of the people with the deliverances of 
the elected legislative assembly: if the assembly is the source of democratic 
legitimacy, to ensure that the will of the people is preserved in the decisions 
made by public agencies, the transmission of the directive from the assembly to 
the individual case has to be made as watertight as possible, and this means the 
minimization of discretion. This first way therefore comes to some of the same 
conclusions as Legality, but it does so for different reasons: whereas Legality was 
grounded in a concern for rule of law values, this first approach to Democracy 
sees the importance of those rule of law as merely derivative of the need to 
preserve the democratic will. The second way is more sanguine about the 
usefulness of rules in anticipating the vagaries of individual cases. It may also see 
something procedurally important about dealing with individual cases as 
individuals rather than just as the instances of a rule. Therefore the second way 
shares something with the reasons given under Morality for leaving space for 
discretion as long as it is used to give consideration to the merits of an individual 
case, but it argues that fairness requires that the decision be made in a way that 
is compatible with each having an individual say. This may seem wholly 
impractical Ȃ are we going to arrange a plebiscite for each sentencing decision? 
But in fact a more feasible, though perhaps still revolutionary, alternative is at 
hand. This is to increase lay participation in criminal justice decision-making in a 
way modelled on the institution of the jury (Dzur, 2012). A jury is randomly 
selected, so in principle anyone could be chosen to make the decisions. This 
preserves fairness, but assembles a group of people who can then deliberate 
meaningfully about what ought to be done. Like the jury, these decision-makers 
would be operating within a legal framework, and would be advised by legal 
officials. They would not be expected to make their decisions out of nowhere. 
However, they would be allowed to make the decision. In this model of 
Democracy, those making the decision may not see the decision made according 
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to their best understanding of the merits of the case. In this it departs from 
Morality. But the procedural values that constrain an individual from deciding 
the case on its merits are not those of Legality but rather those of Democracy: the 
need to make the decision in a way that reflects and does justice to the fact that 
ultimate political authority rests with the people as a whole, a body in which 
each citizen is an equal. 
 
So far this section has illustrated a range of positions a broadly retributivist 
approach might take on the desirability of having a legal framework that allows 
for discretion in sentencing. This allows us to resist the charge that retributivism 
per se cannot deal with the Selection Problem. The Selection Problem says that 
that each criminalisable action committed by the offender should find its way on 
to the charge sheet, and should be reflected in sentencing; that sentencers should 
not have discretion to pick and choose. However, Moralistic Retributivism opens 
up the possibility that such discretion is necessary to correct for distortions 
introduced by the form of legality. Therefore Selection as such is only a problem ȋǮǯȌ
sentencing and offence-classification. There may still be a problem with 
Selection: namely, if the exercise of discretion leads to a failure to respond 
appropriately to the moral gravity of offending behaviour. But that is the 
Fittingness Problem, which we will come on to below. Therefore if Moralistic 
Retributivism is plausible, the Selection Problem is not an independent problem. 
The question, then, is whether some variant of Moralistic Retributivism is 
plausible. We can distinguish extreme from moderate versions of Moralistic 
Retributivism. The extreme version is not prepared to give any weight at all to 
the considerations underpinning Legality. For the extreme Moralistic 
Retributivist, the state of the law should make no difference whatsoever to the 
decisions made at sentencing. Now I take that to be an implausible position. One 
reason for this is that the values of accountability, equity, predictability and so on 
underpinning the case for Legality are not negligible. A publicly accessible 
framework of law makes it possible for citizens to know in advance of sentencing 
roughly how they are likely to be treated; and it makes it possible for the state to 
aspire to treating like cases alike, and thereby approximating a kind of unity or 
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integrity in its dealings with citizens. Those are hugely important advantages of a 
system of law; yet they would be lost if sentencers did not take themselves to be 
constrained by general and publicly accessible rules. However, the implausibility 
of extreme Moralistic Retributivism does not mean that we should abandon 
Morality altogether. Sentencing is the sharp end of the criminal justice system Ȃ 
the point at which someone has to decide what the case against the offender 
actually amounts to, and how he or she should be dealt with. A moderate 
Moralistic Retributivism suggests that the good sentencer does not take the legal 
framework Ȃ those legalistic processes and classifications that have brought the 
offender to the point where he requires a sentence to be given him Ȃ as the final 
word on what that sentence is to be. The good sentencer requires discretion; or 
at least she does as long as there is some evidence that by giving sentencers 
discretion decisions are more likely to reflect a proper balance between pre-legal 
desert and rule of law values. Whether there is such evidence will turn on two 
issues: firstly, whether sentencers are in the main broadly competent to judge on 
matters of pre-legal desert, or the proper balance between pre-legal desert and 
rule of law values, and are in the main broadly motivated to do so 
conscientiously; and secondly, whether pre-legal desert, and its balancing with 
rule of law values, is a complex matter determined by the particulars of 
individual situations, and which therefore resists adequate codification in law or 
sentencing guidelines. The moral complexity of actual situations of law-breaking 
suggests that the latter is highly plausible; whether the former is also plausible is 
beyond the scope of this paper to determine. However, one may for the 
Moralistic Retributivist to address this question might be to make room for the 
concerns of Democracy, in particular the second version of the view that we 
considered above, where a jury or other randomly-selected body should make 
sentencing decisions. It may be, given that deciding upon pre-legal desert is not a 
technical matter but is rather a matter of general moral competence, that both 
for reasons of fairness, but also for reasons of accurate deliberation, having 
decisions made by a panel (who can engage in explicit deliberation about cases) 
rather than by a single judge, might be desirable and compatible with the 
Moralistic approach (Bennett 2014). 
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5. Retributivism, Desert and Perspective 
A moderate version of Moralistic Retributivism can make a plausible argument 
for the existence of discretion at sentencing. This is because on the moderate 
Moralistic view one cannot take the legal categorization of offences for granted: 
such categorisation is merely an approximation to the desert of condemnation or 
punishment that the criminal law aims at. Moralistic Retributivism may restrict 
the range of discretion by arguing that the general justifying aim of criminal 
justice is to distribute such condemnation/punishment according to deserts; and 
hence that Ǯǯ
not bearing on such deserts. It may also recognise the need to restrict discretion 
in order to accommodate rule of law values such as consistency, accountability 
and predictability. But discretion, on the face of it, can and should be considered 
as a necessary accompaniment of judicial decision-making in criminal law. This 
shows why the Selection Problem is not a deep problem for a plausible version of 
retributivism. 
 
However, if we allow cases to be decided as Moralistic Retributivism would 
recommend, by some combination of legal framework supplemented by scrutiny ǡǮǯǫNo: 
solving the Selection Problem would still leave the Fittingness Problem. The 
Fittingness Problem points out that retributivism, for all we have said so far, is 
still tied to the notion that punishment should fit the crime. We have argued that ǯǮǯ literally, and that 
punishment should in part be guided by a form of pre-legal desert to which legal Ǯǯ are only an approximation. But the concern underlying the 
Fittingness Problem is that retributivism still has a problem with multiple 
offeǢǯ pre-legal desert is determined by each 
individual act of wrongdoing in a way that precludes something like a bulk 
discount? Even for Moralistic Retributivism, that is, wrongdoing requires some 
dissociating response, and whatever the specific nature of that response, the 
concern is that each transgression will require its own individual dissociation. So 
the concern goes, at any rate. 
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Let me describe the problem Ǯǯpparently poses for retributivism in slightly technical terms, by 
calling it the problem of Ǯperspective-relativity.ǯ To make Ǯbulk discountsǯ 
compatible with desert it would have to be the case that what an offender 
deserves varies depending on when he is sentenced. If an offender has 
committed a string of offences, and has been apprehended, convicted and 
sentenced for each in turn, he will end up serving much more time, or 
undergoing much more punishment, than he would have had he been convicted 
only after the string of offences was completed and treated as a multiple 
offender. Ǯdiscountǯ only operates if the offender is sentenced at one 
time, or in one context (i.e. in the midst of sentencing for many offences), and not 
in another (i.e. being apprehended and sentenced for each in turn), it seems that 
we can only make sense of this within a retributivist paradigm if desert also 
varies with the context of sentencing. In other words, desert would have to be 
relative to the perspective we have when we are sentencing. Yet, the Fittingness 
Problem concludes, desert cannot be relative to perspective: desert is 
determined by the wrongdoer and his action, not by the perspective from which 
we are now looking back at the wrong. To use technical language again, The 
Fittingness Problem takes it as obvious that desert is property intrinsic to the 
wrongdoer and his action, and not a property of the relation between the 
wrongdoer and the person judging him at a particular time.   
 
I would now like to explore the possibility that, having made the argument for 
the Fittingness problem explicit, we are now able to see the shape of a solution. 
We would have a solution, that is, if there were a good argument against the final 
premiss: if perspective-relativity can affect desert. I will argue that it is not at all 
obvious that retributivists should accept, without further justification, the kind 
of perspective-invariantism regarding desert that would be incompatible with Ǯbulk discounts.ǯ This is not to provide a conclusive argument against those who 
claim to see a conflict between retributivism and such Ǯdiscounts.ǯ But it is to put 
the ball back in their court. They would need to establish that retributivism is 
committed to perspective-invariantism in order to establish their case. 
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So why think perspective-invariantism is not essential to retributivism? We are 
perhaps prompted to think that perspective-invariantism is essential to ǮǤǯphrasing suggests that it is only 
facts about the wrongdoer that make up his or her desert, and that facts about 
the person responding to the wrongdoer (in particular, facts about the person ǯ
offender) must be irrelevant. However, earlier in this essay I claimed that the 
essential thing about retributivism is the principle that it can be morally 
necessary to dissociate oneself from wrongdoing independently of any other 
good consequences that might come from doing so or not doing so. Stated thus, 
this principle leaves it open whether what one needs to do to dissociate oneself 
from the wrongdoing is perspective-invariant. The focus switches from the 
wrongdoer to the person relating to the wrongdoer; the question is what the ǮǯǯǤ
Thinking about matters in this way already makes it clear that it is a further step Ȃ rather than a conceptual necessity Ȃ to the conclusion that retributivism 
requires perspective-invariantism about desert. The theorist who claims that 
there is a conflict between retributivism and bulk discounts would have to show 
why dissociation is perspective-invariant.  
 
But it may also be the case that we can say something stronger. Perhaps looking 
at dissociation as the basis of retributivism favours perspective-relativity. 
Looking at matters in the way I have suggested re-orients things because it 
makes it clear that the crucial thing is a relation between the individual doing the 
dissociating and the wrongdoer. The individual dissociating herself from the 
wrong looks at what the wrongdoer has done, of course. But she then looks at 
what that means for her relationship with the wrongdoer and how that 
relationship must proceed differently in order that the wrongdoing should be 
marked as such. Many contextual factors might be relevant to this in non-legal 
interpersonal contexts, factors that take account of the gravity of the ǯǡǡǤIn interpersonal 
contexts, moral tasks such as dissociation are carried out by expressively 
powerful actions Ȃ such as blame, withdrawal, apology Ȃ that are packed with 
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meaning, and are flexible in their ability to refer to numerous aspects of the 
situation at once. The ideal act of dissociation in a case of multiple offending does 
not ignore the multiple acts in favour of responding to just one; rather it 
synthesises their acknowledgement into a gesture that performs the dissociation 
from each of them. This process of devising a gesture by which reference to 
numerous acts, numerous contextual features can be brought about is an 
extremely important, everyday, but overlooked exercise of practical intelligence. 
It need not, and often cannot be, carried out additively. The process is normally 
one of synthesis rather than aggregation. Such synthesis is something that a 
developed vocabulary of expressive actions allows us to bring about, by virtue of 
the way in which acts like those of dissociation can refer to and acknowledge 
multiple features of the situation in which they are performed.  
 
This inevitably means that proportionality between wrongdoing and response is 
a more complex matter than mere aggregation. A proportionate response to 
wrongdoing is, on this view, roughly the minimum disturbance to normal ǤǮǤǯǡǮǯǤ
idea is that one does what one needs to do to keep from going along with the 
wrongdoing, and that doing more than that would be vindictive, or relishing the 
suffering of the wrongdoer for its own sake, and so on. This already counts in 
favour of eschewing aggregation if possible. Furthermore, the way in which 
social actions bear meaning and are capable of referring to, and acknowledging, 
aspects of their situation, does make it possible for multiple offences to be 
acknowledged non-additively. The remaining question is the substantive one: 
does, and should, a non-additive response to multiple offences strike us as Ǯǯǫ
cases and how they strike us. Say I find myself at a reception with Henry 
Kissinger. Say I think him culpable of numerous wrongs: colluding with Nixon, 
who was plainly corrupt on many levels; countless individual human rights 
violations relating to Vietnam; and being highly influential in making U.S. foreign 
policy isolationist and disproportionately concerned with national interest. And 
say I also think that simple friendliness Ȃ as though he were not guilty of those 
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things Ȃ will unacceptably compromise me. Nevertheless the situation requires 
that I have to choose some way in which to relate to him. I have to sum up my 
attitude towards him in some way of being towards him. It may be hard to say in 
the abstract what the appropriate response in this situation is. But it seems ǯ
should receive individualised proportionate response. 
 
As I have written elsewhere, state punishment can be modelled on this 
understanding of interpersonal dissociation from wrongdoing: ideally, state 
punishment should be guided by an attempt to say how things now stand 
between the state (or the community) and the wrongdoer as a result of the 
offence, given that a relationship with the offender must persist, but that the 
terms of the relationship have changed as a result of the wrong (Bennett 2015). ǡǮǯȂ acknowledging the gravity of the 
wrongdoing Ȃ can sometimes require punishment. However, just as in the 
interpersonal case, iǮǯ
accurately by taking an individualizing, additive response to responding to each 
transgression in a perspective-invariant way. An additive response may well end 
up being disproportionate given the availability of a response that will give the 
offending behaviour due acknowledgement at less cost to the offender. Of course, 
in the legal case, there is pressure to employ generalizable, transparent 
procedures that require regularity and uniformity in state responses. But the 
question is what type of uniformity is required. If moderate Moralistic 
Retributivism is correct, these procedures should be aimed at regulating 
accurate and proportionate moral responses to wrongdoing. If perspective-
relativity applies to proportionate moral response then there is no reason why 
legal procedures should not try to replicate that; indeed, there may be reason to 
think that they would be disproportionate if they did not.  
 
In the legal case just as much as the interpersonal case, then, it is not obvious Ǯǯ
simple way. Focusing on dissociation rather than desert leads us instead to see 
that proportionate condemnation is a relational and perspective-relative matter 
 20 
from the outset; the case of multiple offending is not an outlier. The Fittingness 
Problem arises if it is only through individualising, additive response to each 
crime that one can do justice to the wrongdoing as a whole. But why should we 
think that? Moral commonsense seems to disagree. Although these 
considerations still leave the logical possibility that perspective-invariantism 
should be correct, it puts the onus on the critics of retributivism to defend it.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We have now assembled the materials necessary to address the two problems 
this paper has posed for retributivism and for sentencing practice. I have aimed 
to show that we do not need to give up the bulk discount principle by virtue of its 
conflict with attractive elements of retributive sentencing theory (or vice versa). 
I have taken it that our situǣǮǯ
principle in the sentencing of multiple offenders appears compelling and prima 
facie justified, yet we find it hard to say why it is justified; furthermore, it seems 
to conflict directly with other things we find compelling, such as proportionality. 
My approach argues that this conflict arises because our understanding of 
retributive sentencing theory is too simple. By pointing to the possibility of a 
slightly more nuanced view of what retributivism is about, I have sought both to 
improve our understanding of the retributive tradition, and to remove a barrier Ǯǯ
sentencing practitioners. 
 
The Fittingness Problem said that there is no way for retributivism to explain 
how bulk discounts fit the crime; while the Selection Problem said that there is 
no way for retributivism to explain why it is important to charge and sentence 
only selectively rather than for all instances of wrongdoing. In response, I have 
agreed that common sentencing practice is broadly correct on this point, and I 
have sought to explain why it is correct by explaining how a sophisticated 
version of retributivism might make sense of this practice.  
 
First of all, I distinguished Moralistic from Legalistic Retributivism, where I 
argued that what is important on the former is that punishment should be 
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guided by pre-legal desert. This means that the Moralistic Retributivist should 
see legal classifications such as crimes, charges and convictions as merely 
approximations to the underlying desert that the criminal justice system has the 
right to make its business. This response undermines the Selection Problem. 
Whether the Moralistic Retributivist should endorse the law stemming from 
Canavan is therefore an interesting question: the answer might be that, if she 
should, it would only be for rule of law reasons rather than for retributivist 
reasons.  
 
Secondly, I argued that, on certain plausible assumptions, this first set of points 
should lead the Moralistic Retributivist to favour giving sentencers discretion to 
depart from the apparent requirements of the legal framework and to give out 
sentences that are guided directly by pre-Ǥǯ
should, we argued, be tempered by rule of law values such as consistency across 
cases, predictability of treatment. The task facing sentencers is to find a balance 
between these considerations. But moderate versions of Moralistic Retributivism 
can support this incorporation of rule of law values. The thought that the state 
should speak with one voice and should deal alike with like situations is not, 
after all, entirely alien to the form of retributivism (associated, for instance, with 
Duff) on which the aim of punishment is condemnation in the name of the 
political community as a whole; if it is, consistency across cases Ȃ what Dworkin Ǯǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌȂ is an important part of the package.  
 
And thirdly, I completed the argument against the Fittingness Problem by 
arguing against the assumption Ȃ which I claimed underlies this alleged problem Ȃ that retributivism should take up perspective-invariantism in regard to 
judgements of desert. Perspective-invariantism would be the view that the 
appropriate retributive response to an offender is determined wholly by facts 
about the offender and her wrongdoing, and that facts about the temporal 
perspective of the person making the response is irrelevant. I argued that this is 
unsupported by what I identified as the key motivation for any form of 
retributivism, namely, to avoid complicity or acquiescence in the offence by 
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dissociating oneself from it. At any rate, the critic of retributivism needs to find a 
compelling argument for perspective-invariantism. 
 
In conclusion, then, the plausibility of retributive sentencing theory is not 
threatened by the plausibility of deploying bulk discounts. And a wider lesson for 
retributivists is perhaps that they should be talking less about desert and more 
about dissociation.2  
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